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Abstract
We provide several positive and negative complexity results for solving games with imperfect recall.
Using a one-to-one correspondence between these games on one side and multivariate polynomials
on the other side, we show that solving games with imperfect recall is as hard as solving certain
problems of the first order theory of reals. We establish square root sum hardness even for the
specific class of A-loss games. On the positive side, we find restrictions on games and strategies
motivated by Bridge bidding that give polynomial-time complexity.
2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Representations of games and their
complexity
Keywords and phrases Non-cooperative game theory; extensive form games; complexity; Bridge;
first order theory of reals; polynomial optimization
1 Introduction
The complexity of games of finite duration and imperfect information is a central problem in
Artificial Intelligence. In the particular case of zero-sum two-player extensive form games
with perfect recall, the problem was notably shown to be solvable in polynomial-time [15, 18].
The perfect recall assumption, which states that players do not lose track of any information
they previously received, is mandatory for this tractability result to hold: without this
assumption, the problem was shown to be NP-hard [15, 7].
The primary motivation for our work is to investigate the complexity of the game of
Bridge, a game between two teams of two players each: North and South against West and
East. Bridge is a specific class of multi-player games called team games, where two teams of
players have opposite interests, players of the same team have the same payoffs, but players
cannot freely communicate, even inside the same team (see e.g. [6, 11] for more details).
Interestingly, dropping the perfect recall assumption in zero-sum two player games is enough
to encompass team games: the lack of communication between the players about their private
information can be modeled with imperfect recall. Another motivation to study games with
imperfect recall is that they may be used to abstract large perfect recall games and obtain
significant computational improvements empirically [8, 19].
Our results exhibit tight relations between the complexity of solving games with imperfect
recall and decision problems in the first-order theory of reals FOT(R). A formula in FOT(R)
is a logical statement containing Boolean connectives ∨,∧,¬ and quantifiers ∃,∀ over the
signature (0, 1,+, ∗,≤, <,=). We can consider it to be a first order logic formula in which
each atomic term is a polynomial equation or inequation, for instance ∃x1, x2∀y(0 ≤ y ≤
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2 A Bridge between Polynomial Optimization and Games with Imperfect Recall
1) → (4x1y + 5x22y + 3x31x2 > 4) (where we have used integers freely since they can be
eliminated without a significant blow-up in the size of the formula [17], and the implication
operator → with the usual meaning). The complexity class ∃R consists of those problems
which have a polynomial-time reduction to a sentence of the form ∃XΦ(X) where X is a
tuple of real variables, Φ(X) is a quantifier free formula in the theory of reals. Similarly,
the complexity classes ∀R and ∃∀R stand for the problems that reduce to formulae of the
form ∀XΦ(X) and ∃X∀Y Φ(X,Y ) where X,Y are tuples of variables. All these complexity
classes ∃R, ∀R and ∃∀R are known to be contained in PSPACE [5, 2]. Complexity of games
with respect to the ∃R class has been studied before in strategic form games, particularly for
Nash equilibria decision problems in 3 player games [17, 13, 3].
Our paper provides several results about the complexity of extensive form games with
imperfect recall. First, we show a one-to-one correspondence between games of imperfect
recall on one side and multivariate polynomials on the other side and use it to establish
several results:
In one-player games with imperfect recall, deciding whether the player has a behavioural
strategy with positive payoff is ∃R-complete (Theorem 3). The same holds for the question
of non-negative payoff.
In two-player games with imperfect-recall, the problem is in the fragment ∃∀R of FOT(R)
and it is both ∃R-hard and ∀R-hard (Theorem 4). Even in the particular case where
the players do not have absent-mindedness, this problem is Square-Root-Sum-hard
(Theorem 6).
A corollary is that the case where one of the two players has A-loss recall and the other
has perfect recall is Square-Root-Sum hard, a question which was left open in [7]. While
the above results show that imperfect recall games are hard to solve, we also provide a few
tractability results.
We capture the subclass of one-player perfect recall games with a class of perfect recall
multivariate polynomials. As a by-product we show that computing the optimum of such
a polynomial can be done in polynomial-time, while it is NP-hard in general (Section 4).
This also provides a heuristic to solve imperfect recall games in certain cases, by converting
them to perfect recall games of the same size.
For one-player games where the player is bound to use deterministic strategies, the
problem becomes polynomial-time when a parameter which we call the change degree of
the game is constant (Theorem 25).
We provide a model for the bidding phase of the Bridge game, and exhibit a decision
problem which can be solved in time polynomial in the size of the description (Lemma 26).
2 Games with imperfect information
This section introduces games with imperfect information. These games are played on finite
trees by two players playing against each other in order to optimize their payoff. The players
are in perfect competition: the game is zero-sum. Nature can influence the game with
chance moves. Players observe the game through information sets and they are only partially
informed about the moves of their adversary and Nature.
Playing games on trees.
For a set S, we write ∆(S) for a probability distribution over S.
A finite directed tree T is a tuple (V,L, r, E) where V is a finite set of non-terminal nodes;
L is a non-empty finite set of terminal nodes (also called leaves) which are disjoint from V ;
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Figure 1 One player game G1 on the left, and two player game G2 on the right
node r ∈ V ∪ L is called the root and E ⊆ V × (V ∪ L) is the edge relation. We write u→ v
if (u, v) ∈ E. It is assumed that there is no edge u→ r incoming to r, and there is a unique
path r → v1 → · · · → v from the root to every v ∈ V ∪L. We denote this path as PathTo(v).
We consider games played between two players Max and Min along with a special player
Chance to model random moves during the game. We will denote Max as Player 1 and Min as
Player 2. An extensive form perfect information game is given by a tuple (T , A,Control, δ,U)
where: T is a finite directed tree, A = A1 ∪ A2 is a set of actions for each player with
A1 ∩ A2 = ∅, function Control : V 7→ {1, 2} ∪ {Chance} associates each non-terminal node
to one of the players, δ is a transition function which we explain below, and U : T 7→ Q
associates a rational number called the utility (or payoff) to each leaf. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let
Vi denote the set of nodes controlled by Player i, that is {v ∈ V | Control(v) = i} and let
VChance denote the nodes controlled by Chance. We sometimes use the term control nodes for
nodes in V1 ∪ V2 and chance nodes for nodes in VChance. The transition function δ associates
to each edge u→ v an action in Ai when u ∈ Vi, and a rational number when u ∈ VChance
such that
∑
v s.t. u→v δ(u → v) = 1 (a probability distribution over the edges of u). We
assume that from control nodes u, no two outgoing edges are labeled with the same action
by δ: that is δ(u→ v1) 6= δ(u→ v2) when v1 6= v2. For a control node u, we write Moves(u)
for {a ∈ Ai | a = δ(u → v) for some v}. Games G1 and G2 in Figure 1 without the blue
dashed lines are perfect information games which do not have Chance nodes. Game G−√n
of Figure 4 without the dashed lines gives a perfect information game with Max, Min and
Chance where nodes of Max, Min and Chance are circles, squares and triangles respectively.
An extensive form imperfect information game is given by a perfect information game
as defined above along with two partition functions h1 : V1 7→ O1 and h2 : V2 7→ O2 which
respectively map V1 and V2 to a finite set of signals O1 and O2. The partition functions hi
satisfy the following criterion: Moves(u) = Moves(v) whenever hi(u) = hi(v). Each partition
h−1i (o) for o ∈ Oi is called an information set of Player i. Intuitively, a player does not
know her exact position u in the game, and instead receives the corresponding signal hi(u)
whenever she arrives to u. Due to the restriction on moves, we can define Moves(o) for every
o ∈ Oi to be equal to Moves(u) for some u ∈ h−1i (o). In Figure 1, the blue dashed lines
denote the partition of Max: in G1, {r, u} is one information set and in G2, the information
sets of Max are {u1}, {u2} and {u3, u4}. Max has to play the same moves at both r and u
in G1, and similarly at u3 and u4 in G2. Based on some structure of these information sets,
imperfect information games are further characterized into different classes. We explain this
next.
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Histories.
While playing, a player receives a sequence of signals, called the history, defined as follows.
For a vertex v controlled by player i, let
hist(v) be the sequence
of signals received and actions played by i along PathTo(v), the path from the root to v.
For example in game G2, hist(u3) = {u1} b {u3, u4} (for convenience, we have denoted the
signal corresponding to an information set by the set itself). Note that the information set
of a vertex is the last signal of the sequence, thus if two vertices have the same sequence,
they are in the same information set. On the other hand, the converse need not be true: two
nodes in the same information set could have different histories, for instance node u4 in G2
has sequence {u2} a {u3, u4}.
In such a case, what happens intuitively is that player i does not recall that she received
the signals {u1} and {u2} and played the actions b and a. This gives rise to various definitions
of recalls for a player in the game.
Recalls.
Player i is said to have perfect recall if she never forgets any signals or actions, that is, for
every u, v ∈ Vi, if hi(u) = hi(v) then hist(u) = hist(v): every vertex in an information set
has the same history with respect to i. Otherwise the player has imperfect recall.
Max has imperfect recall in G1, G2 and G−√n whereas Min has perfect recall in all of
them (trivially, since there is only one signal that she receives). Within imperfect recall we
make some distinctions.
Player i is said to have absent-mindedness if there are two nodes u, v ∈ Vi such that u lies
in the unique path from root to v and hi(u) = hi(v) (player i forgets not only her history,
but also the number of actions that she has played). Max has absent-mindedness in G1.
Player i has A-loss recall if she is not absent-minded, and for every u, v ∈ Vi with
hi(u) = hi(v) either hist(u) = hist(v) or hist(u) is of the form σaσ1 and hist(v) of the form
σbσ2 where σ is a sequence ending with a signal and a, b ∈ Ai with a 6= b (player i remembers
the history upto a signal, after which she forgets the action that she played). Max has A-loss
in G−√n since she forgets whether she played a0 or a1. There are still cases where a player is
not absent-minded, but not A-loss recall either, for example when there exists an information
set containing u, v whose histories differ at a signal. This happens when i receives different
signals due to the moves of the other players (including player Chance), and later converges
to the same information set. In this document, we call such situations as signal loss for
Player i. Max has signal loss in G2 since at {u3, u4} as she loses track between {u1} and
{u2}.
Plays, strategies and maxmin value.
A play is a sequence of nodes and actions from the root to a leaf: for each leaf l, the PathTo(l)
is a play. When the play ends at l, Min pays U(l) to Max. The payoffs U(l) are the numbers
below the leaves in the running examples. Max wants to maximize the expected payoff and
Min wants to minimize it. In order to define the expected payoff, we define the notion of
strategies for each player. A behavioural strategy β for Player i is a function which maps each
signal o ∈ Oi to ∆(Moves(o)), a probability distribution over its moves. For a ∈ Moves(o),
we write β(o, a) for the value associated by β to the action a at information set o. For node
u, we write β(u, a) for the probability β(hi(u), a). A pure strategy ρ is a special behavioural
strategy which maps each signal o to a specific action in Moves(o). We will denote the action
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No absentmindedness With absentmindedness
One player NP-complete ∃R-complete (Theorem 3)
Two players
in ∃∀R (Theorem 4)
Square-Root-Sum-hard ∃R-hard and ∀R-hard
(Theorem 6) (Theorem 4)
Figure 2 Complexity of imperfect recall games
associated at signal o by ρ(o), and for a node u we will write ρ(u) for ρ(hi(u)). For a node u
and an action a, we define ρ(u, a) = 1 if ρ(hi(u)) = a, and ρ(u, a) = 0 otherwise. A mixed
strategy is a distribution over pure strategies: λ1ρ1 + λ2ρ2 + · · ·+ λkρk where each ρj is a
pure strategy, 0 ≤ λj ≤ 1 and Σjλj = 1.
Consider a game G. Fixing behavioural strategies σ for Max and τ for Min results
in a game Gσ,τ without control nodes: every node behaves like a random node as every
edge is labeled with a real number denoting the probability of playing the edge. For a
leaf t, let C(t) denote the product of probabilities along the edges controlled by Chance
in PathTo(t). Let σ(t) denote the product of σ(u, a) such that u ∈ V1 and u a−→ v is in
PathTo(t). Similarly, let τ(t) denote the product of the other player’s probabilities along
PathTo(t). The payoff with these strategies σ and τ , denoted as Payoff(Gσ,τ ) is then given
by:
∑
t∈T U(t) · C(t) · σ(t) · τ(t). This is the “expected” amount that Min pays to Max when
the strategies are σ and τ for Max and Min respectively. We are interested in computing
maxσ minτ Payoff(Gσ,τ ). We denote this value as MaxMinbeh(G) and call it the maxmin
value (over behavioural strategies). When G is a one player game, the corresponding values
are denoted as Maxbeh(G) or Minbeh(G) depending on whether the single player is Max
or Min. We correspondingly write MaxMinpure(G), Maxpure(G) and Minpure(G) when we
restrict the strategies σ and τ to be pure. In the one player game G1, Maxpure(G1) is 0 since
the leaf l2 is unreachable with pure strategies. Suppose Max plays a with probability x and b
with 1− x, then Maxbeh(G1) is given by maxx∈[0,1] x(1− x). In G2, a pure strategy for Max
can potentially lead to two leaves with payoffs either 1, 1 or 1, 2 or 2, 0. Based on what Max
chooses, Min can always lead to the node with minimum among the two by appropriately
choosing the action at r. This gives MaxMinpure(G2) = 1. Observe that on the other hand,
MinMaxpure(G2) = 2. It also turns out the MaxMinbeh(G2) = 1, which can be shown by
exploiting the symmetry in the game.
3 Imperfect recall games
In this section we investigate the complexity of imperfect recall games and exhibit tight links
with complexity classes arising out of the first order theory of reals. Finding the maxmin
value involves computing a maxmin over polynomials where the variables are partitioned
between two players Max and Min. It turns out that imperfect recall games can capture
polynomial manipulation entirely if there is a single player. When there are two players, we
show that certain existential and universal problems involving polynomials can be captured
using imperfect recall games. Previously, the only known lower bound was NP-hardness [15].
We show that even the very specific case of two-player games without absentmindedness is
hard to solve: optimal values in such games can be irrational and solving these games is
Square-Root-Sum-hard. A summary of complexity results is given in Table 2.
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Figure 3 One player game for the polynomial 3x2 + 5xy − 8y2 − 1
3.1 One player
We start with the hardness of games with a single player. The important observation is that
there is a tight connection between multi-variate polynomials on one side and one-player
games on the other side.
I Lemma 1. For every polynomial F (x1, . . . , xn) over the reals, there exists a one player
game GF with information sets x1, . . . , xn such that the payoff of a behavioural strategy
associating di ∈ [0, 1] to xi is equal to F (d1, . . . , dn).
Proof. Suppose F (x1, . . . , xn) has k terms µ1, ..., µk. For each term µi in F (x1, . . . , xn) we
have a node si in GF whose depth is equal to the total degree of µi. From si there is a path
to a terminal node ti containing d nodes for variable x, for each xd in µi. Each of these
nodes have two outgoing edges of which the edge not going to ti leads to a terminal node
with utility 0. In the terminal node ti the utility is equal to kci where ci is the co-efficient of
µi.There is a root node belonging to Chance which has transitions to each si with probability
1
k . All the other nodes belong to the single player. All the nodes assigned due to a variable
x belong to one information set. The number of nodes is equal to sum of total degrees of
each term. The payoffs are the same as the co-efficients. Hence the size of the game is
polynomial in size of F (x1, . . . , xn). Figure 3 shows an example (probability of taking l from
information set {u1, u2, u3} is x and the probability of taking l from {v1, v2, v3} is y). Clearly
the reduction from a polynomial to game is not unique. J
The above lemma leads to the hardness of one player games.
I Lemma 2. The following two decision problems are ∃R-hard in one-player games with
imperfect recall: (i) Maxbeh ≥ 0 and (ii) Maxbeh > 0.
Proof. (i) The problem of checking if there exists a common root in Rn for a system of
quadratic equations Qi(X) is ∃R-complete [17]. This can be reduced to checking for a
common root in [0, 1]n using Lemma 3.9 of [16]. We then reduce this problem to Maxbeh ≥ 0.
Note that X is a solution to the system iff −∑iQi(X)2 ≥ 0. Using Lemma 1 we construct
a game GF with F = −
∑
iQi(X)2. It then follows that the system has a common root iff
Maxbeh ≥ 0 in GF .
(ii) We reduce Maxbeh(G) ≥ 0 to Maxbeh(G′) > 0 for some constructed game G′. Suppose
that when Maxbeh(G) < 0, we can show Maxbeh(G) < −δ for a constant δ > 0 that can be
determined from G. With this claim, we have Maxbeh(G) ≥ 0 iff Maxbeh(G) + δ > 0. We
will then in polytime construct a game G′ whose optimal payoff is Maxbeh(G) + δ, which
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then proves the lemma. We will first prove the claim. The proof proceeds along the same
lines as Theorem 4.1 in [17].
Let g(X) be the polynomial expressing the expected payoff in the game G when the
behavioural strategy is given by the variables X. Define two sets S1 := {(z,X) | z =
g(X), X ∈ [0, 1]n} and S2 := {(0, X) | X ∈ [0, 1]n}. If Maxbeh(G) < 0, then S1 and S2 do
not intersect. Since both S1, S2 are compact, this means there is a positive distance between
them. Moreover, S1 and S2 are semi-algebraic sets (those that can expressed by a boolean
quantifier free formula of the first order theory of reals). Corollary 3.8 of [17] gives that this
distance > 2−2L+5 where L is the complexity of the formulae expressing S1 and S2, which in
our case is proportional to the size of the game. However, since δ is doubly exponential, we
cannot simply use it as a payoff to get Maxbeh(G) + δ.
Define new variables y0, y1, . . . , yt for t = L+5 and polynomials Fi(y0, . . . , yt) := yi−1−y2i
for i ∈ {1, . . . , t − 1} and Ft(y0, . . . , yt) := yt − 12 . The only common root of this system
of polynomials Fi gives y0 = 2−2
t = δ. Let P := −∑i F 2i (y0, . . . , yt) and let GP be the
corresponding game as in Lemma 1. Construct a new game G′ as follows. Its root node is
a Chance node with edges to three children each with probability 13 . To the first child, we
attach the game G, and to the second child, the game GP . The third child is node which is
controlled by Max and belongs to the information set for variable y0. It has two leaves as
children, the left with payoff 0 and the right with payoff 1. Observe that the optimal payoff
for max in G′ is 13 (Maxbeh(G) + δ). From the discussion in the first paragraph of this proof,
we have Maxbeh(G) ≥ 0 iff Maxbeh(G′) > 0. J
The previous lemma shows that the game problem is ∃R-hard. Inclusion in ∃R is
straightforward since the payoff is given by a polynomial over variables representing the
value of a behavioural strategy at each information set. For example, for the game G1 of
Figure 1, deciding Maxbeh(G1) ≥ 0 is equivalent to checking ∃x(0 ≤ x ≤ 1 ∧ x(1− x) ≥ 0).
We thus get the following theorem.
I Theorem 3. For one player games with imperfect recall, deciding Maxbeh ≥ 0 is ∃R-
complete. Deciding Maxbeh > 0 is also ∃R-complete.
3.2 Two players
We now consider the case with two players. Analogous to the one player situation, now
MaxMinbeh(G) ≥ 0 can be expressed as a formula in ∃∀R. For instance, consider the game
G2 of Figure 1. Let x, y, z, w be theprobability of taking the left action in u1, u2, {u3, u4}
and r respectively. Deciding MaxMinbeh(G2) ≥ 0 is equivalent to the formula ∃x, y, z∀w(0 ≤
w ≤ 1→ (wx+ 2w(1− x)z + 2(1− w)y(1− z) + (1− w)(1− y) ≥ 0)). This gives the upper
bound on the complexity as ∃∀R. Hardness is established below.
I Theorem 4. Deciding MaxMinbeh(G) ≥ 0 is in ∃∀R. It is both ∃R-hard and ∀R-hard.
Proof. Inclusion in ∃∀R follows from the discussion above. For the hardness, we make use
of Lemma 2. Note that when there is a single player Max, Maxbeh(G) ≥ 0 is the same as
MaxMinbeh(G) ≥ 0. As the former is ∃R-hard, we get the latter to be ∃R-hard. Now we
consider the ∀R-hardness. Since Maxbeh(G) > 0 is also ∃R-hard, the complement problem
Maxbeh(G) ≤ 0 is ∀R-hard. Hence the symmetric problem Minbeh(G) ≥ 0 is ∀R-hard. This
is MaxMinbeh(G) ≥ 0 when there is a single player Min, whence MaxMinbeh(G) ≥ 0 is
∀R-hard. J
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In these hardness results, we crucially use the squaring operation. Hence the resulting
games need to have absentmindedness. Games without absentmindedness result in multilinear
polynomials. The hardness here comes due to irrational numbers. Examples were already
known where maxmin behavioural strategies required irrational numbers [15] but the maxmin
payoffs were still rational. We generate a class of games where the maxmin payoffs are
irrational as well. The next lemma lays the foundation for Theorem 6 showing square
root sum hardness for this problem. The Square-Root-Sum problem is to decide if∑m
i=1
√
ai ≤ p for given positive integers a1, . . . , am, p. This problem was first proposed in
[12], whose complexity was left as an open problem. The notion of Square-Root-Sum-
hardness was put forward in [9] and has also been studied with respect to complexity of
minmax computation [14] and game equilibrium computations [10]. In [9, 14] the version
discussed was to decide if
∑m
i=1
√
ai ≥ p. But our version is computationally same since the
equality version is decidable in P [4]. The Square-Root-Sum problem is not known to be
in NP. It is known to lie in the Counting Hierarchy [1] which is in PSPACE.
When Max has A-loss recall and Min has perfect recall, deciding maxmin over behavioural
strategies is NP-hard [7]. The question of whether it is Square-Root-Sum-hard was posed in
[7]. We settle this problem by showing that even with this restriction it is Square-Root-Sum-
hard.
I Lemma 5. For each n ≥ 0, there is a two-player game G−√n without absentmindedness
such that MaxMinbeh(G−√n) = −
√
n.
Proof. First we construct a game G1 whose maxmin value is n(n+1−2
√
n)
(n−1)2 from which we get
a game G2 with maxmin value n+ 1− 2
√
n by multiplying the payoffs of G1 with (n−1)
2
n .
Then we take a trivial game G3 with maxmin value −(n+ 1) and finally construct G−√n by
taking a root vertex r as chance node and transitions with 1/2 probability from r to G2 and
G3.
We now describe the game G1. The game tree has 7 internal nodes and 16 leaf nodes
with payoffs. At the root node s, there are 2 actions a0 and a1, playing which the game
moves to s0 or s1. Then again at si the action b0 and b1 are available playing which the game
can go to s0,0, s0,1, s1,0 or s1,1. And finally again playing action c0 or c1 the game can go to
the leaf states {ti,j,k | i, j, k ∈ {0, 1}}. The node s is in one information set I1 and belongs
to Max. The nodes s0 and s1 are in one information set I2 and also belong to Max. Nodes
s0,0, s0,1, s1,0 and s1,1 are in the same information set J and belong to Min. The payoff at
t0,0,0 is n and the payoff at t1,1,1 is 1. Everywhere else the payoff is 0.
Figure 4 depicts the game G−√n and the left subtree from chance node is G1 after scaling
the payoffs by (n−1)
2
n . We wish to compute the maxmin value obtained when both the
players play behavioural strategies. Assigning variables x, y, z for information sets I1, I2, J
respectively, the maxmin value is given by the expression
max
x,y∈[0,1]
min
z∈[0,1]
nxyz + (1− x)(1− y)(1− z)
which in this case is equivalent to
max
x,y∈[0,1]
min(nxy, (1− x)(1− y))
since the best response of Min is given by a pure strategy when Min has no absentmindedness.
It turns out this value is achieved when nxy = (1− x)(1− y). We use this to get rid of y
and reduce to:
max
x∈[0,1]
nx(1− x)
1 + (n− 1)x
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Figure 4 Game G−√n
Calculating this we see that the maximum in [0, 1] is achieved at x =
√
n−1
n−1 . After evaluation
we get MaxMinbeh(G1) = n(n+1−2
√
n)
(n−1)2 as intended, at x = y =
√
n−1
n−1 . J
I Theorem 6. Deciding MaxMinbeh ≥ 0 is Square-Root-Sum-hard in imperfect recall
games without absentmindedness.
Proof. From the positive integers a1, ..., am and p which are the inputs to the Square-Root-Sum
problem, we construct the following game Gˆ. At the root there is a chance node rˆ. From rˆ
there is a transition with probability 1m+1 to each of the games G−√ai (as constructed in
Lemma 5) and also a trivial game with payoff p. Now Max can guarantee a payoff 0 in Gˆ iff∑m
i=1
√
ai ≤ p. J
In the proof above since in each of G−√n, Max has A-loss recall and Min has perfect
recall, the same holds in Gˆ. Hence it is Square-Root-Sum-hard to decide the problem
even when Max has A-loss recall and Min has perfect recall.
4 Polynomial optimization
In Section 3 we have seen that manipulating polynomials can be seen as solving one-player
imperfect recall games (Lemma 1 and Figure 3). In particular, optimizing a polynomial with
n variables over the domain [0, 1]n (the unit hypercube) can be viewed as finding the optimal
payoff in the equivalent game. On the games side, we know that games with perfect recall
can be solved in polynomial time [15, 18]. We ask the natural question on the polynomials
side: what is the notion of perfect recall in polynomials? Do perfect recall polynomials
correspond to perfect recall games? We answer this question in this section.
Consider a set X of real variables. For a variable x ∈ X, we write x¯ = 1−x and call it the
complement of x. Let X¯ = {x¯ | x ∈ X} be the set of complements. We consider polynomials
with integer coefficients having terms over X ∪ X¯. Among such polynomials, we restrict our
attention to multilinear polynomials: each variable appearing in a term has degree 1 and no
term contains a variable and its complement. Let M(X) be the set of such polynomials. For
example 3xyz − 5x¯y¯z + 9z¯ ∈M({x, y, z}) whereas 4xx¯ 6∈M({x}) and 4x2 /∈M({x}).
For f, g ∈ M(X) we write f ≡ g if eliminating the negations from f and g gives the
same full expansion. For example, y − yx ≡ yx¯ and yx¯+ x ≡ y + xy¯. By definition, the full
expansion f ′ of a polynomial f satisfies f ≡ f ′. Also note that ≡ is an equivalence relation.
10 A Bridge between Polynomial Optimization and Games with Imperfect Recall
We are interested in the problem of optimizing a polynomial f ∈ M(X) over the unit
hypercube [0, 1]|X|. The important property is that the optimum occurs at a vertex. This
corresponds to saying that in a one-player imperfect recall game without absentmindedness,
the optimum is attained at a pure strategy (which is shown by first proving that every
behavioural strategy has an equivalent mixed strategy and hence there is at least one pure
strategy with a greater value). Due to this property, the decision problem is in NP. Hardness
in NP follows from Corollary 2.8 of [15].
I Theorem 7 ([15]). The optimum of a polynomial in M(X) over the unit hypercube [0, 1]|X|
occurs at a vertex. Deciding if the maximum is greater than or equal to a rational is
NP-complete.
Our goal is to characterize a subclass of polynomials which coincide with the notion
of perfect recall in games. For this we assume that games have exactly two actions from
each information set (any game can be converted to this form in polynomial-time). The
polynomials arising out of such games will come from M(X) where going left on information
set x gives terms with variable x and going right gives terms with x¯. When the game has
perfect recall, every node in the information set of x has the same history: hence if some
node in an information set y is reached by playing left from an ancestor x, every node in y
will have this ancestor and action in the history. This implies that every term involving y
will have x. If the action at x was to go right to come to y, then every term with y will have
x¯. This translates to a decomposition of polynomials in a specific form.
A polynomial g given by xf0(X0)+x¯f1(X1)+f2(X2) is an x-decomposition of a polynomial
f if x /∈ X0∪X1∪X2 and expanding all complements in g and f result in the same complement-
free polynomial. The decomposition g is said to be disconnected if X0, X1, X2 are pairwise
disjoint. For example g := xyz + 4x¯y+ 5w¯ is an x-decomposition of xyz + 4y− 4xy+ 5− 5w
which is not disconnected due to variable y. Using these notions, we now define perfect recall
polynomials in an inductive manner.
I Definition 8 (Perfect recall polynomials). Every polynomial over a single variable has
perfect recall. A polynomial f with variable set X has perfect recall if there exists an x ∈ X
and an x-decomposition xf0(X0) + x¯f1(X1) + f2(X2) of f such that (1) it is disconnected
and (2) each fi(Xi) has perfect recall.
This definition helps us to inductively generate a perfect recall game out of a perfect
recall polynomial and vice-versa, giving us the following theorem.
I Theorem 9. A polynomial f in M(X) has perfect recall iff there is a one-player perfect
recall game whose payoff is given by f . This transformation from perfect recall polynomial to
one-player perfect recall game can be computed in polynomial time.
We prove both directions of the above theorem separately in the following lemmas. The
proof below showcases a stronger result that from a perfect recall polynomial, we can in fact
construct a perfect information game.
I Lemma 10. For every perfect recall polynomial f , there is a perfect information game
with payoff given by f .
Proof. We construct the game inductively. For single variable polynomials c0x+ c1x¯, the
game has a single non-terminal node with two leaves as children. The left leaf has payoff
c0 and the right has payoff c1. The behavioural strategy at this single node is given by x
to the left node and x¯ to the right node and hence the payoff is given by c0x+ c1x¯. Now
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consider a perfect recall polynomial with multiple variables. Consider the x-decomposition
xf0(X0) + x¯f1(X1) + f2(X2) which witnesses the perfect recall. Each Xi has fewer variables
since x is not present. By induction, there are perfect recall games G0, G1, G2 whose payoffs
are given by f0, f1, f2 respectively. Construct game G with the root being a Chance node
with two transitions each with probability 12 . To the right child attach the game G2. The left
child is a control node with left child being game G0 and the right child being G1. This node
corresponds to variable x. Finally multiply all payoffs at the leaves with 2. The payoff of this
game is given by xf0(X0) + x¯f1(X1) + f2(X2). Since the decomposition is disconnected, the
constructed is also perfect recall. This construction gives us a perfect information game. J
I Lemma 11. The payoff of a perfect recall game is given by a perfect recall polynomial.
Proof. Once again, proof proceeds by induction. Every game with a single information set is
clearly perfect recall and the payoff polynomial is perfect recall by definition. Pick a game G
with multiple information sets. We need to consider two cases depending on the root node.
Suppose the root r of G is a control node with information set x. Since G is perfect recall,
no other node is present in this information set x. Let G0, G1 be the left and right subtree
of r. Again, as G has perfect recall, no information set straddles across the two subtrees.
Hence the payoff of G can be written as a disconnected x-decomposition xf0(X0) + x¯f1(X1)
where f0, f1 are the payoffs of G0 and G1 respectively. Moreover, the games G0 and G1 have
perfect recall. By induction, the payoffs f0, f1 are perfect recall polynomials.
Suppose the root r belongs to Chance. Walking along some path from the root, we will
hit the first node that is controlled by the player. Let x be the information set for this node.
As the player has perfect recall, for every node in x the path from the root to it contains only
Chance nodes. Let L0, L1 be the set of leaves that are reached by taking respectively the left
or right action from a node in x. Let L2 be all the other leaves in G. The payoff of G can be
written as xf0(X0) + x¯f1(X1) + f2(X2) where xf0(X0) gives the contribution of L0, x¯f1(X1)
gives that of L1 and f2(X2) gives the payoff from L2. This polynomial is an x-decomposition
which is disconnected since G has perfect recall. It remains to show that f0, f1, f2 are perfect
recall polynomials. For this we show that there are perfect recall games G0, G1, G2 with
fewer variables that yield f0, f1, f2. Induction hypothesis then tells that they are perfect
recall polynomials. Game G0 is as follows: root node belongs to Chance; add a transition
from root to all left subtrees of nodes in x; if there are m such subtrees then each transition
has probability 1m+1 ; finally multiply all payoffs by m+ 1. Game G1 is similarly constructed
by taking right subtrees. Game G2 is obtained from G by replacing subtrees starting from x
by leaves with payoff 0. Each of these constructed games preserves perfect recall. J
Theorem 9 allows to optimize perfect recall polynomials in polynomial-time by converting
them to a game. However, for this to be algorithmically useful, we also need an efficient
procedure to check if a given polynomial has perfect recall. For games, checking perfect
recall is an immediate syntactic check. For polynomials, it is not direct. We establish in this
section that checking if a polynomial has perfect recall can also be done in polynomial-time.
The crucial observation that helps to get this is the next proposition.
I Proposition 12. If a polynomial f has perfect recall, then in every disconnected x-
decomposition xf0(X0) + x¯f1(X1) + f2(X2) of f , the polynomials f0(X0), f1(X1) and f2(X2)
have perfect recall.
We will first prove the above proposition through some intermediate observations. The
lemma below follows by definition of perfect recall polynomials and the relation ≡ between
polynomials.
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I Lemma 13. A polynomial f has perfect recall iff its full expansion has perfect recall.
I Corollary 14. Let f, g be polynomials such that f ≡ g. Then f has perfect recall iff g has
perfect recall.
I Lemma 15. Let xf0(X0) + x¯f1(X1) + f2(X2) and yg0(Y0) + y¯g1(Y1) + g2(Y2) be two
disconnected decompositions of f . Then:
1. either xf0 ≡ yg0, x¯f1 ≡ y¯g1 and f2 ≡ g2,
2. or xf0 ≡ y¯g1, x¯f1 ≡ yg0 and f2 ≡ g2,
3. or xf0 + x¯f1 ≡ g2 and f2 ≡ yg0 + y¯g1
Proof. When x = y, we can show the first statement of the lemma. When x 6= y, we need to
consider the following cases: (a) y ∈ X0 and x ∈ Y0, (b) y ∈ X1 and x ∈ Y0 and (c) y ∈ X2
and x ∈ Y2. The other cases are either symmetric or impossible. Cases (a), (b), (c) entail
the first, second or third statements of the lemma respectively. Proof proceeds by routine
analysis of the terms in the full expansion of f . J
Proof of Proposition 12.
Proof proceeds by induction on the number of variables. When there is a single variable,
the proposition is trivially true. Consider polynomial f over multiple variables. Since it
has perfect recall, there is a disconnected decomposition yg0(Y0) + y¯g1(Y1) + g2(Y2) such
that g0, g1, g2 have perfect recall. Lemma 15 gives the three possible relations between the
two decompositions xf0 + x¯f1 + f2 and yg0 + y¯g1 + g2. For cases (1) and (2), we make
use of Corollary 14 to conclude the proposition. For case (3), we have xf0 + x¯f1 ≡ g2 and
f2 ≡ yg0 + y¯g1. It is easy to see that f2 has perfect recall since g0 and g1 have perfect recall.
Let f ′ = xf0 + x¯f1. We know that f ′ has perfect recall, has fewer variables than f and
xf0 + x¯f1 is a disconnected decomposition of f ′. By induction hypothesis, f0 and f1 have
perfect recall. J
Note proposition 12 claims that “every” disconnected decomposition is a witness to perfect
recall. This way the question of detecting perfect recall boils down to finding disconnected
decompositions recursively.
Finding disconnected decompositions.
The final step is to find disconnected decompositions. Given a polynomial f and b ∈ {0, 1},
we say x cancels y with b if substituting x = b in f results in a polynomial without y-terms
(neither y nor y¯ appears after the substitution). For a set of variables S, we say x cancels S
with b if it cancels each variable in S with b. We say that x cancels y if it cancels it with
either 0 or 1.
I Lemma 16. Let f be an arbitrary polynomial and x, y be variables. Variable x cannot
cancel y with both 0 and 1 in f .
I Lemma 17. Let f ∈M(X) and let g be the polynomial obtained by rewriting every x¯t by
t− tx. Then, x cancels y with b in f iff x cancels y with b in g.
I Corollary 18. For b ∈ {0, 1} and x, y ∈ X, we have x cancels y with b in f iff x cancels y
with b in the full expansion of f .
I Corollary 19. Let f, g be polynomials such that f ≡ g. Then for b ∈ {0, 1} and x ∈ X, we
have {y | x cancels y with b in f} equal to {y | x cancels y with b in g}
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I Lemma 20. Let xf0(X0) + x¯f1(X1) + f2(X2) be an x-decomposition of f . Then, the
decomposition is disconnected iff for b ∈ {0, 1}, Xb equals {y | x cancels y with b in f}.
Proof. Suppose xf0(X0) + x¯f1(X1) + f2(X2) is disconnected. Then clearly, the conclusion to
the forward implication follows. Now consider an x-decomposition xf0(X0)+x¯f1(X1)+f2(X2)
which is not necessarily disconnected to start off with. Call this decomposition g. Suppose
Xb = {y | x cancels y with b in f}. By definition g ≡ f . From Corollary 19, f and g have
the same cancellations due to x. Here we make a claim that a variable x cannot cancel y
with both 0 and 1. This claim can be easily shown. This shows that X0 ∩X1 = ∅. We know
that x /∈ X2 by definition of the x-decomposition. If some y ∈ X0 ∩X2 then y cannot get
canceled by x with respect to 0 in g and hence also in f . This shows that X0 ∩ X2 = ∅.
Similar argument also shows that X1 ∩X2 = ∅. J
This lemma provides a mechanism to form disconnected x-decompositions starting from a
polynomial f , just by finding variables that get canceled and then grouping the corresponding
terms.
I Theorem 21. There is a polynomial-time algorithm to detect if a polynomial has perfect
recall.
Proof. Here is the (recursive) procedure.
1. Iterate over all variables to find a variable x such that the x-decomposition xf0(X0) +
x¯f1(X1) + f2(X2) of f is disconnected. If no such variable exists, stop and return No.
2. Run the procedure on f0, f1 and f2.
3. Return Yes.
When the algorithm returns Yes, the decomposition witnessing the perfect recall can be
computed. When the algorithm returns No, it means that the decomposition performed in
some order could not be continued. However Proposition 12 then says that the polynomial
cannot have perfect recall. J
The combination of Theorems 9 and 21 gives a heuristic for polynomial optimization:
check if it is perfect recall, if yes convert it into a game and solve it, if not perform the general
algorithm that is available. This heuristic can also be useful for imperfect recall games. The
payoff polynomial of an imperfect recall game could as well be perfect recall (based on the
values of the payoffs). Such a structure is not visible syntactically in the game whereas the
polynomial reveals it. When this happens, one could solve an equivalent perfect recall game.
5 Pure strategies and bridge
We have seen that maxmin computation over behavioural strategies is as hard as solving very
generic optimization problems of multivariate polynomials over reals. Here we investigate
the case of pure strategies. We first recall the status of the problem.
I Theorem 22. [15] The question of deciding if maxmin value over pure strategies is at least
a given rational is Σ2-complete in two player imperfect recall games. It is NP-complete when
there is a single player.
In this section we refine this complexity result in two ways: we introduce the chance
degree of a game and show polynomial-time complexity when the chance degree is fixed; next
we provide a focus on a tractable class of games called bidding games, suitable for the study
of Bridge.
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5.1 Games with bounded chance
We investigate a class of games where the Chance player has restrictions. In many natural
games, the number of Chance moves and the number of options for Chance are limited -
for example, in Bridge there is only one Chance move at the very beginning leading to a
distribution of hands. With this intuition, we define a quantity called the chance degree of a
game.
I Definition 23 (Chance degree). For each node u in the game, the chance degree c-deg(u)
is defined as follows: c-deg(u) = 1 if u is a leaf, c-deg(u) =
∑
u→v c-deg(v) if u is a chance
node, and c-deg(u) = maxu→v c-deg(v) if u is a control node. The chance degree of a game
is c-deg(r) where r is the root.
The chance degree in essence expresses the number of leaves reached with positive
probability when players play only pure strategies. For example, the chance degrees of games
G2 (Figure 1) and G−√n (Figure 4) are 1 and 2 respectively.
I Lemma 24. Let G be a one player game with imperfect recall, chance degree K and n
nodes. When both players play pure strategies, the number of leaves reached is atmost K.
The optimum value over pure strategies can be computed in time O(nK).
Proof. The first statement follows from an induction on the number of non-terminal nodes.
Partition the set of leaves into bags so that leaves arising out of different actions from
a common Chance node are placed in different bags. Here is an algorithm which iterates
over each leaf starting from the leftmost till the rightmost, and puts it in a corresponding
bag. Suppose the algorithm has visited i leaves and has distributed them into j bags. For
the next leaf u, the algorithm finds the first bag where there is no v such that the longest
common prefix in PathTo(u) and PathTo(v) ends with a Chance node. If there is no such
bag, a new bag is created with u in it. It can be shown that the number of bags created is
equal to the chance degree K of the game.
In the partitioning above, for every Chance node u and for every pair of transitions
u
a−→ u1 and u b−→ u2, the leaves in the subtrees of u1 and u2 fall in different bags. Moreover
two leaves differ only due to control nodes and hence while playing pure strategies, both
these nodes cannot both be reached with positive probability. Therefore, once this partition
is created, a pure strategy of the player can be seen as a tuple of leaves 〈u1, . . . , um〉 with at
most one leaf from each bag such that for every stochastic node u which is an ancestor of
some ui, there is a leaf uj in the subtree (bag) of every child of u. The payoff of the strategy
is given by the sum of C(t)U(t) for each leaf t in the tuple where U(t) is the payoff and C(t)
is the chance probability to reach t. This enumeration can be done in O(nK). J
I Theorem 25. Consider games with chance degree bounded by a constant K. Optimum in
the one player case can be computed in polynomial-time. In the two player case, deciding if
maxmin is at least a rational λ is NP-complete.
Proof. Lemma 24 says that the optimum for a single player can be computed in O(nK)
where n is the number of nodes. Since K is fixed, this gives us polynomial-time. For the
two player case, note that whenever Max fixes a strategy σ, the resulting game is a one
player game in which Min can find its optimum in polynomial-time. This gives the NP upper
bound. The NP-hardness follows from Proposition 2.6 of [15] where the hardness gadget has
no Chance nodes. Hence hardness remains even if chance degree is 1. J
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Since the two player decision problem is hard even when fixing the chance degree, we need
to look for strong structural restrictions that can give us tractable algorithms. Perfect recall
is of course one of them. In the subsequent section, we consider a model of the bidding phase
of bridge as an imperfect recall game, and investigate some abstraction that can guarantee
polynomial-time.
5.2 A model for Bridge bidding
We propose a model for the Bridge bidding phase. We first describe the rules of a game which
abstracts the bidding phase. Then we represent it as a zero-sum extensive form imperfect
recall game.
The bidding game.
There are four players N,S,W,E in this game model, representing the players North, South,
West and East in Bridge. Players N,S are in team Tmax and E,W are in team Tmin. For
a player i ∈ {N,S,W,E}, we write Ti to denote the team of player i and T¬i for the other
team. This is a zero-sum game played between teams Tmax and Tmin. Every player has
the same set of actions {0, . . . , n} where 0 imitates a pass in Bridge and action j signifies
that a player has bid j. Each player i has a set Hi of possible private signals (also called
secrets). Let H = HN ×HE ×HS ×HW . Initially each player i receives a private signal from
Hi following a probabilistic distribution ∆(H) (in Bridge, this would be the initial hand of
cards for each player). The game is turn-based starting with N and followed by E,S,W and
proceeds in the same order at each round. Each player can play a bid which is either 0 or
strictly greater than the last played non-zero bid. The game ends when i) N starts with bid
0 and each of E,S,W also follow with bid 0 or ii) at any point, three players consecutively
bid 0 or iii) some player bids n. At the end of the game the last player to have played a
non-zero bid k is called the declarer, with contract k equal to this bid. It is 0 if everyone bids
0 initially. The payoff depends on a set of given functions Θi : H 7→ {0, . . . ,m} with m ≤ n
for each player i. The function Θi(〈hN , hE , hS , hW 〉) gives the optimal bid for player i as a
declarer based on the initial private signal h received. The payoff for the teams Tmax and
Tmin are now computed as follows: when i is the declarer with contract k and h ∈ H is the
initial private signal for i, if Θi(h) ≥ k, Ti gets payoff k whereas T¬i gets −k. If Θi(h) < k ,
Ti gets −k and T¬i gets k.
As an example of this model consider a game where HE = HW = {⊥} and HN = HS =
{♠,♦}. There are four possible combinations of signals in H, and the players receive each of
them with probability 14 . Players E,W have trivial private signals known to all and so Θ
does not depend on their signal. A Θ function for n = 5,m = 4 is given in Figure 5. For
example, when the initial private signal combination is (♠,⊥,♠,⊥) and N is the declarer,
then the contract has to be compared with 4. For the same secret, if S is the declarer
then the contract has to be compared with 2. The longest possible bid sequence in this
game is (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, 5). Let us demonstrate team payoffs with a few
examples of bid sequences. For the initial private signals (♠,⊥,♠,⊥) and the bid sequence
(0, 1, 0, 2, 4, 0, 0, 0), N is the declarer with contract 4, and Tmax and Tmin get payoff 4 and
−4 respectively. On private signals (♠,⊥,♦,⊥) and the bid sequence (2, 3, 0, 0, 0), E is the
declarer with contract 3 and Tmax and Tmin receive payoffs 3 and −3 respectively.
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Θ
Player (♦,♦) (♦,♠) (♠,♦) (♠,♠)
N 0 0 2 4
E 0 0 0 0
S 0 2 0 2
W 0 0 0 0
Figure 5 Example of a bidding game
Bidding games in extensive form.
Given a bidding game with the specifications as mentioned above, we can build an extensive
form game corresponding to it. The root node is a Chance node with children H and
transitions giving ∆(H). All the other nodes are control nodes. We consider them to belong
to one of the four players N,E, S,W . However finally we will view it as a zero-sum game
played between Tmax and Tmin. These intermediate nodes are characterized by sequences of
bids leading to the current state of the play. Let Seq be the set of all possible sequences of
bids from {0, . . . , n} due to game play. The set Seq also contains the empty sequence . The
nodes in the extensive form game are the elements of Seq. For each sequence s there is a set
of valid next moves which contain 0 and the bids strictly bigger than the last non-zero bid in
s. These are the actions out of s. Leaves are bid sequences which signal the end of the play.
The utility at each leaf is given by the payoff received by Tmax at the end of the associated
bid sequence.
Finally, we need to give the information sets for each player. Let Seqi be the sequences
that end at a node of player i. Each player observes the bid of other players and is able
to distinguish between two distinct sequences of bids at his turn. But, player i does not
know the initial private signals received by the other players. Hence the same sequence of
bids from a secret of i and each combination of secrets of the other players falls under one
information set. More precisely, let Hi = Hi × Seqi be the set of histories of player i. Two
nodes of player i are in the same information set if they have the same history in Hi. Note
that each individual player N,E,W, S has perfect recall. When considered as a team, Tmax
and Tmin have imperfect recall. The initial signal for a team is a pair of secrets (hN , hS)
or (hE , hW ) and within an information set of say N , there are nodes u and v coming from
different initial signals (hN , hS) and (hN , h′S). This makes the game a signal-loss recall for
each team. Therefore the only general upper bound for maxmin computation is ∃∀R with
behavioural strategies and Σ2 with pure strategies. Observe that the chance degree of the
game is |H| since there is a single Chance node. When we bound this initial number of
secrets H by some K, and vary the bids and payoff functions, we get a family of games with
bounded chance degree. Theorem 25 gives slightly better bounds for computing the maxmin
over pure strategies for this family of games, which is still NP-hard for the two-player case.
This motivates us to restrict the kind of strategies considered in the maxmin computation.
We make one such attempt below.
Non-overbidding strategies.
A pure strategy for player i is a function σi : Hi 7→ {0, . . . , n}. In the example of Figure 5, N
has to pass on the information whether she has ♦ or ♠ to S, and in the case that N has ♠,
player S has to pass back information whether she has ♦ or ♠ so that in the latter case N
can bid for 4 in the next turn. When E knows the strategy of N , she can try to reduce their
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Θ
Player h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6
N 3 4 5 0 0 0
E 1 3 2 2 2 4
S 0 0 0 3 4 5
W 0 0 0 0 0 0
Figure 6 A second example of a bidding game
payoff by playing 3 when N plays 2 (if she bids 4, her team loses and Tmax gets a payoff
4 anyway) and not let S over-bid to pass information to N . But in the process E ends up
overbidding when S has ♦ and it makes no difference to the total expected payoff. This
gives strategies σN (♦) = 0, σN (♠) = 2, σS(♦, 0bE) = 0, σS(♠, 0bE) = 2 (when possible),
σS(♠, 20) = 3 and σS(♠, 23) = 0, where bE is a placeholder for some bid of E. When it
comes back to N for the second turn and S had played 3, then N plays 4 if she can, otherwise
she passes. This pair of strategies achieves the maxmin payoff.
A pure strategy σi of player i is said to be non-overbidding if starting from her second
turn, player i always bids 0: more precisely, for h ∈ Hi and s ∈ Seqi, σi(h, s) = 0 whenever
there exists s0 ∈ Seqi with s0 a proper prefix of s. Otherwise, the strategy is said to be
over-bidding. The strategy of N above is over-bidding since N could potentially bid 4 after 2.
The number of non-overbidding strategies is |HN | · (n+ 1) for N and |HS | · (n+ 1) for S and
hence for team Tmax there are |HN | · |HS | · (n+ 1)2 non-overbidding strategies. Similarly
there are |HE | · |HW | · (n + 1)2 non-overbidding strategies for Tmin. These numbers are
drastically smaller compared to the number of pure strategies, which is exponential in the
size of the extensive form (and doubly exponential in the size of the input description).
I Lemma 26. Maxmin value over non-overbidding strategies can be computed in time
|H| · (n+ 1)4.
Of course, non-overbidding strategies will not be in general the same as maxmin over pure.
In particular, for the example of Table 5 the strategy σN mentioned before is over-bidding.
It turns out that in some cases, considering non-overbidding strategies is sufficient. Consider
the game given in Figure 6. The only player to receive a private signal is N . All others
have a publicly known trivial signal ⊥. Player N can receive one of 6 secrets h1, . . . , h6. In
this case N bids 3, 4, 5 from h1, h2, h3 making the optimal contract in her first turn. From
h4, h5, h6 she bids 0, 1, 2 in her first turn and S gaining complete information about secret of
N due to her distinct actions, bids 3, 4, 5 respectively if E has not already made those bids.
Here non-overbidding strategies are sufficient to obtain maxmin expected payoff.
We have exhibited a class of strategies that can be efficiently computed and which are
sufficient for some games. We leave the more general question of checking how close the value
computed by non-overbidding strategies is to the actual maxmin as part of future work.
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